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Abstract: 
What are the consequences of Syriza coming to power in Greece in 2015? Did it become a new 
Weimar Germany for the future Europe? In this article we test the hypothesis that winning two 
consecutive parliamentary elections in 2015 and forming a government contributed to a farther 
institutionalisation of this party within the rules of Greek democracy. This article is based on data 
from the Greek Ministry of Interior and the website of the Greek parliament. This text aims at 
presenting the process of transformation of Syriza - a radical, left-wing, anti-establishment and 
anti-austerity party into a governmental entity, pro systemic and accepting the principle of the 
democratic state of law. All this was due to the establishing of the governmental coalition with 
ANEL, a nationalist party; social-economic reforms; the reform of the electoral system for 
parliamentary elections; the proposal of a constitutional reform and the ending of the nearly 30-
year dispute with Macedonia. The electoral failure during the parliamentary elections on the 7th 
of July 2019 finishes a 4-year governance of Syriza and enables us to try to evaluate this 
experiment for the first time. A key finding of our investigation is the need to highlight the 
respect for the democratic rules by Syriza during its government and its further 
institutionalisation as one of the main groupings of the contemporary party system in Greece. 
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Introduction 
In 2015, in January and September, elections were held to the Greek parliament and in 
both of them it was the radical left party Syriza, that won. It did not however gain the absolute 
majority in the Deputy Chamber. In just couple of years it has evolved from a coalition of over a 
dozen political entities into one group, which gave it eight times stronger electoral support. An 
important moment for the party’s history was the economic crisis of 2008 and the inability of 
state’s elites to govern. For the first time since the collapse of the Regime of Colonels in 1974 
and the establishment of the democratic system the ruling parties – the conservatives from New 
Democracy and the socialists from PASOK, have lost a great deal of their supporters. The Greek 
party system has become fragmented and was destabilized. It was only after the parliamentary 
election of 2015 that a leading party has been chosen and it was this party that was to lead Greece 
out of the difficult economic, social and political situation. The problem was, that it was Syriza, 
party that till then has been characterized as antiestablishment and anti-government party, known 
for its politics against the agenda of austerity. It electoral success came as a shock to the 
European liberal democracies. It was also a kind of experiment. Syriza’s electoral success was on 
the one hand treated as a chance for more radical changes in the post-democratic reality (e.g. 
Chantal Mouffe’s – left populism; Mouffe 2018: 14-16), on the other hand Cas Mudde was afraid 
of a new Weimar in Greece (Mudde 2017: 7-10). 
The article analyzes some aspects of the political agenda of the Syriza’s government in 
the coalition with a smaller right and nationalistic party – Independent Greeks. The time span 
being studied here is from the Syriza’s first electoral win on the 25 January 2015 till the elections 
held on 7 July 2019, when Syriza becomes a party of opposition. 
The basic research problem is the process of evolution of Syriza from an anti-
establishment party to party in government; if and how was Syriza able to implement its political 
agenda, while in power. Was it a threat to democratic institutions? Our first hypothesis is as 
follows: the time when Syriza was in power (2015-2019) has helped in its institutionalization and 
led to the abandonment of its most radical political ideas. Second hypotheses: Syriza’s less 
radical political agenda and its functioning within the frames of democratic political system were 
influenced by external and internal political factors. 
Political Preferences 
 
7 
Methodology used in the article is based on the comparative method within a single-case 
study based on the analysis of Syriza’s years in government (Caramani 2017: 55-56). Data used 
come from websites of the Greek Ministry of Interior and the Greek parliament, as well as press. 
Authors decided to show chosen aspects of the evolution of the party: 1. Winning both 
parliamentary elections in 2015 and the government coalition with ANEL; 2. Constitutional 
reform from 2016; 3. Solving the conflict with Macedonia (the so called Prespa Agreement); 
4. Back in opposition – the parliamentary elections from 2019. 
 
The double parliamentary elections of 2015. The coalition government with ANEL 
Syriza was created before the parliamentary election of 2004 as a coalition of over a 
dozen different entities – leftist, ecological, communist and other independent activist groupings 
fighting for the minority rights. The basis for its formation was Synaspismós – Coalition of 
Leftist and Ecological Movements (Συνασπισμόςτης Αριστεράςτων Κινημάτωνκαιτης 
Οικολογίας, Συνασπισμόςor ΣΥΝ) which was established in 1992. Alexis Tsipras was its 
member. In 2009 he replaced Alekos Alavanos as a leader of the coalition. At the beginning of its 
functioning Syriza stressed its unity and radicalism as well as its unwillingness to cooperate with 
socialists and reformists. In 2004 Syriza had 6 deputies in the House, gaining 3.3% (all chosen 
deputies came from Synaspismós). Next important step in Syriza’s functioning was its evolution 
from a loose coalition into a political party during a congress held on 10-14 July 2013. Aleksis 
Tsipras was chosen again to be the party’s secretary in pre-elections, linking different ideological 
movements (anti-capitalist, trockist and movements connected with communist, socialist or 
feminist ideology). 
An important impact on the Greek political scene had the economic crisis of 2008 which 
led to the political destabilization. Difficult domestic situation was believed to be caused by the 
corrupt two-party system and one-party governments led by either center-right New Democracy 
or center-left party PASOK (All Greek Socialist Movement). There was hope for change with the 
possible win of PASOK in the parliamentary election from 4 October 2009. Unfortunately, the 
worsening of economic situation of the country made the government sign the so called First 
Memorandum – a document guaranteeing Greece help from its international partners. With lots 
of accompanying protests and manifestations the socialists established an act accepting the 
international help (ΦΕΚ 2010). Gradually, as in Spain, more and more groups refusing to accept 
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the austerity agenda started to crop up. Among them were Direct Democracy Now – Indignant 
Citizens Movement and Constitution Square Movement (Skai 2011). 
Greece was unable to cope with the economic crisis and further international help was 
required which led to the acceptation of two more memorandums in 2012 and 2015 – 
Memorandum II and III. Financial support was available on the provisional basis - Greece had to 
agree to implement economic reforms. The control of the implementation was granted to 
International Monetary Fund, European Commission and Central European Bank. A referendum 
called by the coalition government that was held on 5 July 2015 has showed that citizens wanted 
the government to decline the offer of next financial agreement that would impose more budget 
cuts. There was a threat of Grexit – Greece leaving the euro zone. It did not mean however that 
the credit negotiations were easier. Eventually, the terms agreed upon in the III Memorandum 
were approved by the Greek parliament in August 2015, the money were transferred by European 
institutions in August 2018. 
The consequences of economic crisis, especially the austerity agenda, privatization and 
structural reforms contributed to a quick degradation process and impoverishment of the society 
leading to the radicalization of the public opinion and the creation of the new socio- political 
cleavage: for/against the Memorandum (which supplanted the classical left-right cleavage) on the 
basis of which radical groups like Syriza or neonazist Golden Dawn gained importanceand 
traditional parties deteriorated. The aforementioned parties, being against the Memorandum, were 
created before the economic crisis, but they were not relevant parties then. 
The lack of political stability and waves of protests led to earlier elections on 6 May, then 
on 17 May 2012. Two elections were the result of the fragmentation of the party system. The 
vitality index had the highest levels in Greek history – 48.7 (May 2012), what means that every 
second voter changed their preferences. There were 7 parties in the Parliament. Both elections 
were won by New Democracy, support for it amounted to 18.85% in May and 29.66% in June 
(which was the result of fears of Syriza winning). Golden Dawn, a neofacist party got into the 
parliament for the first time, with the support of 7% of voters. It was created by Nikolaos 
Michaloliakos in 1983 and it connects itself with NSDAP (it uses a symbol similar to swastika). 
Its main goal is to get rid of immigrants. 
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Table 1. Results of the Greek parliamentary elections in the years 2007-2015 
Party name 
2007 2009 2012 (I) 2012 (II) 2015 (I) 2015 (II) 
V S V S V S V S V S V S 
SYRIZA 5.04 14 4.59 13 16.79 52 26.89 71 36.34 149 35.46 145 
ND 41.84 152 33.49 91 18.85 108 29.66 129 27.81 76 28.10 75 
PASOK 38.10 102 43.94 160 13.18 41 12.28 33 4.68 13 6.28 17 
KKE 8.15 22 7.53 21 8.48 26 4.50 12 5.47 15 5.55 15 
LAOS 3.80 10 5.62 15 - - - - - - - - 
Golden Dawn - - - - 6.97 21 6.92 18 6.28 17 6.99 18 
Independent 
Greeks (ANEL) 
- - - - 10.62 33 7.51 20 4.75 13 3.69 10 
Democratic Left 
(DIMAR)* 
- - - - 6.11 19 6.25 17 - - - - 
The River 
(To Potami) 
- - - - - - - - 6.05 17 4.09 11 
Union of Centrists - - - - - - - - - - 3.43 9 
V – percentage of votes; S – number of seats in the 300-seat House of Deputies 
*DIMAR in a coalition with PASOK in the elections of 20 September 2015 
Source: The Hellenic Parliament. http://www.parliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Ekloges/Eklogika-
apotelesmata-New/ (15/11/2015). 
 
After the elections on 17 June 2012 Syriza became the second political Power in Greece, 
with the support of 26% of voters, losing with New Democracy by just 3%. With the society 
being dissatisfied with the politics of austerity of parties in power after 1974, Syriza could start 
preparing to taking the reins of the state. The first phase of preparations was changing the internal 
structure, it moped from being a coalition to being a political party (July 2013). Its members 
chose their new leader - Alex Tsipras. Second phase was the preparation of a political 
programme, which was announced in August 2014 as “The Thessaloniki Programme” – the 
National Reconstruction Plan . Its main tenets were based on 4 themes: 1) Confronting the 
humanitarian crisis; 2) Restarting the economy and promoting tax justice; 3) Regaining 
employment; 4)Transforming the political system to deepen democracy (SYRIZA 2014; 
Ratajczak 2018: 244-245). 
Inability to choose a president of Republic led to earlier election held on 25 January 2015. 
Syriza won the election gaining 36.34 % of votes and 149 seats. The result did not let it create the 
government on its own, as a majority of 151 seats is needed, so National Patriotic Alliance –
ANEL- a populist nationalist right party became its natural coalition partner. National Patriotic 
Alliance was created by Panos Kammenos in 2012 by former New Democracy activists. In the 
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January election is got 4.75% of votes and 13 seats. What united those two entities? First of all, 
the patriotic idea of rebuilding the country and anti-memorandum stance (Mudde 2015), as well 
as friendly relationship between the their leaders (Aravantinou Leonidi 2015). Alexis Tsipras was 
chosen a prime minister, becoming at the same time the youngest Greek Prime Minister since 
1865. 
Despite radical slogans against Greek dependence and humiliation by international 
financial institutions and even threats of Grexit and the return to Greek currency, negotiating a 
next financial help agreement – the so called III Memorandum worth 7.2 billion EUR, became a 
necessity. The Syriza-ANEL government also made some populist decisions, like giving some of 
the earlier dismissed government employees their work back or opening a TV station ERT that 
was closed in 2014. At last, the Greece was lent Money in August 2015. Before that, though, the 
government conducted a referendum on 5 July and 61.31% of Greeks were against the terms of 
the negotiated financial agreement. Yanis Varoufakis, a controversial Minister for Finance 
resigned (Lorencka 2017: 114-116). Tsipras decided to hold earlier elections. The other reason 
for such a decision was a protest of some of Syriza’s members, like Panagiotis Lafazanis from the 
radical wing of the party or Zoe Kostantopoulou, the head of the House, who called the prime 
minister a “traitor of the Thessaloniki Programme” (Aravantinou Leonidi 2015: 5). 
 
Figure 1. Geographical areas of support in the parliamentary elections of 25 January 2015 
 
 
Syriza      New Democracy 
Source: Greek Ministry of Internal Affairs. http://ekloges-rev.singularlogic.eu/v2015a/v/public/index.html# 
{%22cls%22:%22main%22,%22params%22:{}} (15/11/2015). 
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Figure 2. Geographical areas of support in the parliamentary elections of 20 September 2015 
 
Syriza      New Democracy 
Source: Greek Ministry of Internal Affairs. http://ekloges.ypes.gr/current/v/public/index.html#{%22cls%22 
:%22main%22,%22params%22:{}} (15/11/2015). 
 
On 20 September 2015 the election was held and Syriza got 35.46% of the votes (145 
seats) and ANEL 3.69% (10 seats), creating second government with Tsipras as its leader. The 
financial help Niven to Greece Since 2018 meant structural reforms and further politics of 
austerity. The crucial changes included: the improving of the VAT system, extending the tax 
base, program of cuts in budget expenditure, privatisation and modernisation of public sector, 
reform of justice system, energy sector reform, bank governance and the establishment of the 
revenue agency, reduction of pensions and reform of the pension system, abolition of many social 
benefits, tax increases and other economic changes (Ratajczak 2018: 248-250).  
Syriza’s reform plans included a gradual enlargement of lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender (LGBT) rights in Greece. In the years 2015-2019 new laws were passed concerning: 
legality of same-sex sexual activity, recognition of same-sex relationships, child adoption and 
foster care, discrimination and hate speech, gender identity and expression, sex education in 
schools. 
One of the most important changes proposed by the government of Syriza-ANEL was the 
electoral reform and the project of revision of the Constitution. 21 July 2016 a new electoral law 
was established what meant the end of the majority bonus - 50 seats for the winning party. Also 
the age limit for voters was lowered – voters have to be 17 years old. The 3% threshold was 
upheld (ΦΕΚ 2016). In accordance with art. 54 of the Constitution from 1975, the change of the 
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electoral system cannot be implemented immediately, the new law is valid in next elections, as it 
was not approved by the 2/3 majority (179 votes were in favor of the changes: Syriza, ANEL, 
Union of Centrists). 
 
The Constitutional reform  
Before analyzing the constitutional revision project presented by the Tsipras Government 
in 2016 it is crucial to focus on the influence exerted by a certain narrative of the Greek political 
situation and the constitutional framework. 
The Constitution of 1975 has been the basic instrument for the transition to democracy 
after the fall of the colonel’s dictatorship. A first limited constitutional revision was passed in 
1986 and affected only eleven articles of the text. It was proposed by the PASOK government 
and passed accordingly with the amending formula set by art. 110. Its intention was basically 
aimed at the strengthening of the Prime Minister’s role within the institutional framework. A 
broad political consensus among the two major parties supported the second revision in the 
constitutional history of Greece in 2001. It was for the New democracy the turn to promote 
changes to a wide-range of articles of the existing constitutional text. Over 48 articles were 
subject to constitutional revision and four new articles were added making the Greek constitution 
one of the most detailed ones in the western world. A new and extensive revision of the 
Constitution was initiated in 2004 by the New Democracy led government. The revision process 
ended in 2008. Despite the wide amendment proposal, not supported by the opposition party 
PASOK, only limited changes were adopted, the most important of which affected the 
parliamentary incompatibility with the exercise of any other professional activity. As it has been 
shown, past constitutional revisions proved insufficient to provide effective answers to the 
shortcomings of the constitutional culture and Greek politics, neglecting to strengthen the rule of 
law. 
But in which way are constitutions able to promote the Rule of Law? This is a crucial and 
longstanding question to which scholars have sought an answer. To this respect the analysis of 
the recent constitutional amendment attempts in Greece may be emblematic, as the proposal 
issued by the Tsipras government seeks to reaffirm the rule of law, but essentially fails its goal. 
Since the outbreak of the crisis discussions about constitutional reform have been continued, 
although the initiation of a formal amendment process was blocked until 2013, due to the time-
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constraints imposed by the constitutional amending formula1. The severe institutional 
malfunctions detected in Greece, such as the increase of fast-track legislation, the abdication of 
the legislature to the advantage of the Executive, the rise of the far-right and of the far-left 
populist parties may not be solely considered as distinctive features qualifying the Greek case.  
All throughout the crisis calls for radical constitutional change became frequent, reaching 
the point of entertaining the idea of a complete re-draft of the Constitution. Nevertheless, Greek 
political elite seemed to ignore the severe problems faced by the society where strong political 
polarization, populism and corruption wounded and left significant scars over the country’s 
political culture very hard to heal (Aravantinou Leonidi et al. 2017; Aravantinou Leonidi 2015). 
It is indeed certain that the crisis triggered the debate over constitutional revision, as many 
political actors discovered themselves being convinced that it was the Constitution that was to 
blame for the crisis and its devastating social costs. This is clearly one way to put it and it is 
somehow misleading. The other is that the Greek constitution proved highly adaptable to 
changes, while it was the political system that collapsed, because of endemic corruption, 
populism and nepotism. In the end, probably both approaches can be equally accepted. The crisis 
unearthed the great demand for change coming from the Greek society characterized more and 
more by a profound loss of confidence in parliamentary institutions. How this wave of 
dissatisfaction has been interpreted by the political actors as a mandate to initiate a radical 
revision of the fundamental charter of the country, where other more urgent legislative actions 
could have been taken without a formal amendment process is a question probably to be left 
unanswered2. The recent parliamentary adoption of the new electoral law has convinced the 
Prime Minister (ΦΕΚ 2016), Alexis Tsipras, that the time for the constitutionalization of the 
proportional system is ripe and that the decision can no longer be delayed (Antoniou 2016a). 
The core issues around which the political and academic debate developed in Greece are 
essentially: the institution of a Constitutional Court (Mavrias 2013, 2005; Vegleris 1967, 1979; 
Ierapetritis 2005: 443), the provision of direct election for the President of the Republic, the 
strengthening of the role of the Parliament, the strengthening of direct democracy through the 
introduction of the referendum as a key political instrument and finally the constitutionalization 
of the electoral system. The latter proposal has been considered as a strong element of rupture 
 
1 The requirement that a new revision process cannot be initiated within five years from the previous represents a 
characteristic feature of the Greek amending formula and a serious obstacle to constitutional innovation. 
2 Several scholars have recently called for changes that are indeed of a constitutional character but concern the 
substantial and not the formal Constitution. 
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with respect to the intentions of the Greek constituents who considered more appropriate to vest 
the power to establish the electoral system in ordinary laws rather than in the Constitution. The 
parliamentary form of government is, therefore, an unchangeable organizing principle of the 
constitutional system, as well as the multi-party system and the rule of law. The amending power 
is vested exclusively in the unicameral Parliament and no other constitutional body can interfere. 
As it has been said the amending procedure is quite complex and it is structured into two 
stages. The need for a revision of the Constitution shall be established by a decision taken by the 
Parliament, upon the proposal of at least fifty deputies and by a majority of three-fifths of the 
total number of Assembly members, in two votes by roll-call held at least one month apart. The 
provisions that are to be revised are specifically defined by this resolution. It will then be up to 
the next Parliament, the so-called Revisional Parliament to proceed to the amendment of the 
constitutional provisions within its first term. It is worth noting that art.110 provides for a system 
of reversed majorities and the adoption of the revision proposal by the first and the second 
Parliament. The Constitution of 1975 introduced this system to guarantee a certain equality 
among the first Parliament and the Revision Parliament. In case a proposal receives the absolute 
majority of the members of the “Boulì ton Ellìnon” (Βουλη των Ελληνων) in the first Parliament, 
but not the supermajority of the three-fifths, the Revisional Parliament proceeds to the 
amendment of the constitutional provisions with a majority of three-fifths of its members and 
vice versa. Each revision of the Constitution that has been passed is published in the Official 
Journal no later than ten days following the vote of the Assembly and comes into force with a 
special resolution of the Chamber. The amending formula sets a mandatory time lapse between 
revisions, that is, revision of the Constitution is not permitted within five years of the completion 
of the previous one3. 
 
The Tsipras Constitutional amendment proposal in detail 
In 2016, few days after the parliamentary vote on the new electoral law, on July 25, the 
Greek Prime Minister announced his proposals for a revision of the Constitution of Greece 
(Antoniou 2016b). Making continuous reference to what he defined as “the new transition”, 
Alexis Tsipras, presented the SYRIZA-ANEL constitutional amendment proposal structured in 
 
3 The time-constraints set by the Constitution have been recently challenged by Greek constitutional law scholars 
paving the way to a new interpretative approach according to which the five-year constraint should be referred to the 
time before a constitutional amendment procedure is concluded and not to the pause between one revision and the 
other. This latest approach has gained some support especially in the aftermath of recent necessity (Metaxas 2016). 
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five “axes”: regime architecture, reinforcement of direct democracy, reinforcement of the rule of 
law, State-Church relations, social rights.  
As for the changes affecting the form of government, the proposal entails the 
constitutionalization of proportional representation; the establishment of the constructive vote of 
no-confidence on the model of Art.67 of the German Basic Law (Mißtrauenim Bundestag) ; the 
direct election of the President of the Republic - the President would be elected by the Parliament 
if a qualified majority of two-thirds in two consecutive votes were reached (Tsiliotis 2019; 
Pararas & Blaxopoulos 2019). If these votes prove fruitless, then the people would directly elect 
one of the first two candidates that emerged from the parliamentary vote; the enhancement of the 
competences of the President of the Republic; fixed tenure for members of parliament suggesting 
that no member of parliament can be elected for more than two consecutive parliamentary 
periods or eight consecutive years; the express provision that to be appointed as Prime Minister - 
with the exception of caretaking ones - one would have to be a member of the parliament. The 
strengthening of direct democracy is, in fact, the second point entrenched in the proposal of the 
Greek government, which intended to make mandatory consultative referendums for the transfer 
of state functions. A major innovation is the introduction of referendums by popular initiative. A 
referendum on a “national issue” could be initiated by 500,000 citizens; while one million 
signatures would be sufficient to call for a referendum to reject a bill approved by the Chamber- 
with the exception of budgetary bills4. 
The third axis of the proposal aimed to strengthen the rule of law through the 
establishment of a Supreme Court composed solely of judges entitled to rule on the 
constitutionality of a law following a proposal of the President of the Republic or 120 deputies. It 
also provided for the abolition of parliamentary immunities and a radical overhaul of the 
provisions relating to the responsibility of ministers. 
Regarding the relations between the Greek State and the Orthodox Church (art. 3 Cost.), 
the government's proposal provides for the formalization of state secularism reserving, however, 
for historical and practical reasons, to the orthodoxy the status of dominant religion. The text also 
provides for the abolition of the obligation for state officers, judges and other public officials to 
take an oath in the hands of the ecclesiastical authorities of the Greek Orthodox Church (Art. 59 
 
4 Currently, referendums on crucial national issues may only be held following a decision of the absolute majority of 
parliament (art.44 par.2). Prior to the 5 July 2015 bailout referendum no referendum had been held in Greece since 
the 1975 Constitution was enacted. For a focus on the role of the people in constitutional amending processes see  
Contiades & Fotiadou 2016. 
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par. 1, Art. 33 par. 2). The Greek Government’s proposal made also some special provisions 
concerning social rights, expressly prohibiting lifting public management of water and energy, 
banning any privatization in these sectors, safeguarding collective negotiations as the only means 
for the definition of wages, and introducing arbitration as a mandatory means for the resolution of 
relevant labor disputes5. Since its introduction, the 2016 revision proposal has triggered a debate 
among constitutional law scholars and politicians (Pikramenos 2017). It achieved its peak in 2018 
during a parliamentary debate in which the impossibility to reach any political deal between the 
Syriza-led government and the other political forces on the major axes of the reform emerged 
vividly. 
 
What’s next? After the July 2019 election 
The revision process started by the Tsipras government in 2016 is now at a dead point and 
maybe has turned out being a trap rather than an opportunity to make that change the former 
Prime Minister of Greece called for (Alivizatos 2018). Things have radically changed after the 
July 2019 general election. After a decade of turmoil the newly-elected government led by the 
conservative party of Nea Dimokratia, which won the elections with a significant majority, is 
promising to put Greece back on the tracks of economic recovery and political stability. But there 
are serious concerns stemming from the endemic deficiencies of the political system and the 
unclear ties between Nea Dimokratia and populist nationalism. Ten years ago, along with the 
debt crisis, came the anger against the political establishment and the rising xenophobia. These 
brought to the forefront new political forces, which, before the crisis were in the margins: Syriza 
in the far left of social democracy, and Golden Dawn in the far right of the far right. Although 
Golden Dawn has not managed to be re-elected to parliament in these recent elections, though 
still sitting in the European Parliament, another far-right party has made its way in the political 
arena: it is called Elliniki Lysi (Greek solution) and its ideological discourse is closer than it may 
seem to that of Golden Dawn. Greece’s new conservative Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, is 
the big winner of the last elections. He promises to set a new tone after four-and-a-half years of 
often rollercoaster rule under his leftwing predecessor Alexis Tsipras, but it is left to be seen if he 
 
5 The academic community has been very active in the debate over the constitutional reform. The exchanges among 
constitutional law professors have been hosted by the legal review Επίκαιρα Θέματα Συνταγματικού Δικαίου (Current 
Topics of Constitutional Law), European Center of Constitutional Law, Themistocles Tsatsos Foundation. The 
debate over the reform has crossed academic borders and reached the wider public, also thanks to the initiative 
promoted by a leading Greek newspapers. Among the many scholars who have spoken out on the pages of the 
newspaper see Ierapetritis 2016. 
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will be able to impose his values over the strong far-right tendencies running in his party and 
which may affect severely also the newly announced constitutional revision proposal. One of the 
most important points stressed by Mitsotakis during the election campaign was to stop the 
“catastrophic constitutional revision” set forth by the Syriza Government and change the electoral 
law (Pinakidis 2019). The time is ripe to make further remarks on the new Government’s 
intentions, but what is certain is that the 2016 constitutional revision proposal is not there to stay. 
 
The Prespa Agreement 
The long-standing bitter name dispute between Greece and Skopje (Kofos 1986; 2005; 
Koukoudakis 2018; Marinov 2013) was settled by the Prespa Agreement at Lake Prespa on 17 
June 2018 (Rohdewald 2018), and its subsequent ratification by the Macedonian and Greek 
parliaments in late 2018 and early 2019, and the official renaming of Macedonia to North 
Macedonia in February 2019. 
The name dispute was reignited after the break-up of Yugoslavia and dominated the 
discourse ever since bilateral and international relations.A northern province of Greece is also 
called Macedonia (as, famously, was the country of Alexander the Great) and Greece saw in the 
name Macedonia a territorial and cultural claim on Greek land. Greece insisted on Macedonia 
being called the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in international 
organizations.  
With this Act, in exchange for changing the name of the State, the Head of the 
Macedonian Government Zoran Zaev obtained from his Greek counterpart, Alexis Tsipras, a 
promise of the removal of the veto for joining NATO and the European Union (Armakolasa 
& Triantafyllou 2017). To make the agreements effective, the two Governments both had to 
overcome the nationalist forces within their respective states and then comply with certain 
obligations. Indeed, 2019 opened with the parliamentary debate on the Macedonian constitutional 
reform required by the agreements and necessary for their implementation, which will be 
examined in detail in the sections dedicated to the institutions of Northern Macedonia. After a 
difficult negotiation with some deputies expelled by the opposition party VMRO-DPMNIE and 
with the leaders of the two parties of the Albanian minority, the government managed to secure 
the support necessary to obtain the parliamentary approval of the four constitutional amendments 
presented. The Government succeeded only in extremis to find an agreement with the two 
Albanian parties, pledging to support their requests through the approval of further subsequent 
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rules. In this way, on 11 January, the constitutional reform was approved by a qualified majority 
of 81 representatives. The voting also took place in this case in the absence of the deputies of 
VMRO-DPMNIE. Consequently, from 12 February the new name of the State has officially 
become Northern Macedonia. The name issue was also the subject of the presidential election 
campaign. In fact, of the three candidates who presented themselves in the first round on 21April, 
namely Stevo Pendarovski, (SDU), Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova (VMRO-DPMNIE), and the 
Albanian independent Blerim Reka the first two particularly clashed right around this point. 
In Greece the Prespa Agreement, which recognizes the name of “North Macedonia”, led 
to a strong popular backlash, with riots breaking out in Athens and Thessaloniki, and to a 
political fallout which was expensively paid by the Tsipras’ Government at the general election 
of July 2019 (Klapsis 2018; Mavrozacharakis 2019). In January the parliamentary vote on the 
Agreement severely threatened the Greek government led by Alexis Tsipras obliged to seek the 
Parliament’s confidence vote, following the resignation, notified on 13 January, of Defense 
Minister Panos Kammenos, head of the ANEL party (Independent Greeks), junior partner in the 
Greek government. Kammenos, leader of a nationalist and right-wing party, albeit in coalition 
since 2015 with Tsipras, left the ministerial position due to profound differences relating to the 
historic controversy with Skopje. 
In his speech to the House, prior to the confidence vote, Prime Minister Tsipras referred 
to two crucial constitutional issues, on which further discussion is worth. 
The first question is whether or not the Government was obliged to seek the confidence of 
Parliament after the dissolution of the government coalition (Tsiliotis 2018). The Prime Minister 
expressed the view, which is probably the prevailing one in scholarship, that in this particular 
case there was a potential submission of confidence by the Government under Article 84 (1) of 
the Constitution. In this view, as long as there is no change in the face of the Prime Minister, the 
issue of confidence is left to the political discretion of the Government. However, especially in 
the event of the collapse of a coalition government and since there is no longer an undisputed 
absolute parliamentary majority supporting the Government, the opinion that the Government is 
constitutionally bound to raise a question of confidence is also strongly supported. In fact, from 
the point of view of constitutional ethics, such an obligation exists even when the Government 
still holds the absolute parliamentary majority, as happened after the withdrawal of DIMAR in 
2013 from the three-party ND-PASOK-DIMAR coalition government. It is important, however, 
that the Prime Minister implicitly accepted, that the political legitimacy of the Government in the 
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process of casting a vote of confidence requires an absolute majority of 151 members. This tends 
to create a strong political "precedent" that makes it difficult for minority governments to form in 
Greece. The paradox is, of course, that the current Greek constitution, because of its persistence 
in pursuing the goal of governmental stability, not only allows but also shields minority 
governments, as a majority vote of 120 is sufficient to obtain a confidence vote. The second issue 
concerns the free mandate of the Members of Parliament, which was warmly endorsed by the 
Prime Minister in the House, in a way that leads to almost complete supremacy of the 
representative system (Rule 51 (2) ed: "Members represent the Nation") above to the system of 
political parties (Article 29 (1) of the Constitution), on which the functioning of the democratic 
principle under the current Constitution is based. There is no doubt that under Article 51 par. 2 
the MP is free to vote in accordance with and against the directions of his/her party, without 
being subject to any legal sanction (eg. loss of parliamentary office). This is given and cannot be 
changed even by a revision of the Constitution, because Article 51 (2) of the Constitution of 1975 
belongs to the provisions that determine the basis of the current parliamentary regime. The Greek 
premier, Alexis Tsipras, successfully passed the vote of confidence that he had asked to 
Parliament. According to the official count, 151 parliamentarians voted in favor of the Tsipras 
government, including several independents. Support for the government was also assured by 
some deputies recently expelled by ANEL for having announced their vote in favor of the 
government and the ratification of the Prespa agreement over the name of the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. 
According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Policy (MFA 2019) the Prespa Agreement 
ratified by the Greek Parliament on 1 February 2019 will bring some advantageous consequences 
for Greece: 
1) The neighboring country is named Northern Macedonia and the permanent international 
recognition of FYROM with its constitutional name (over 130 countries) ends. From 
now on, not only will the name of the country cease to be "Macedonia", but they cannot 
be called "Macedonian", without the designation "North" of all state institutions, public 
buildings or even private entities, provided they are funded by the state or have been 
established by law (Article 1 (3) (g)) 
2) The European perspective and stability in the neighboring country are strengthened, 
thereby reducing the risk of third-party designs being influenced by alienated designs on 
Greece's northern border. 
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3) Not only does significant diplomatic capital safeguard Greece's other, growing, 
challenges, but it also strengthens its role in the region as a European pillar of peace and 
security and weakens the aggressive nationalism of other forces. 
4) The role of Macedonia and Thrace in the regional economic hub is being upgraded. 
Greece and FYROM, pending nomenclature, have a contractual framework of bilateral 
relations that is completely inadequate, the contractual framework of Greece's relations 
with then Yugoslavia. There are no key agreements, such as the Investment Protection 
and Double Taxation Agreement and all other modern economic and road and rail 
financial agreements, which implies this lack of investment in our neighbor, our 
exports, our road, rail and energy interconnection, for the port of Thessaloniki and its 
natural economic hinterland. 
5) For the first time the neighboring country recognizes that it has nothing to do with 
Macedonia's "ancient Greek culture, history, culture and heritage" (Article 7 (3), (4)). In 
addition, it commits itself (Article 8 (2), (3)) to the deconstruction of the notorious 
program of witchcraft (anything "referring in any way to ancient Greek history and 
culture that forms an integral component of Greece's historical or cultural heritage" in 
infrastructure / buildings / monuments) and for the removal of the Vergina Sun from all 
public spaces and withdrawal from any public use. This process has even begun, with 
the renaming of the neighboring Airport already under way, as well as the National 
Road to Skopje. It should be noted that, of course, there has never been a question of 
restricting the use of the term Macedonia in relation to Greece, which maintains it in its 
entirety (eg Macedonia Airport). 
6) FYROM modifies the aggressive designations of all its state bodies and public 
institutions / bodies / organizations, as well as those of private institutions / bodies / 
organizations that are state-sponsored or constituted by law in order to respond to the 
compound name ('the North' Macedonia "and no longer" Macedonian "). 
7) The neighboring country is bound by the Agreement (Articles 4, 6) and amending its 
Constitution (Articles 3 and 49) to eliminate any form of revisionism and alienation (by 
public or private actors), respecting sovereignty, territorial integrity and Greece's 
political independence and the principle of non-interference in Greece’s internal affairs. 
8) It is also envisaged to set up a Joint Interdisciplinary Committee of Experts on 
Historical, Archaeological and Educational Issues, which will examine, among other 
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things, school textbooks in order to eliminate, as specifically defined, alienated 
references (eg "Greater Macedonia" maps). 
9) Any possibility of claiming "rights" for a so-called minority in Greece is eliminated. The 
neighboring country pledges that "nothing in its constitution as it is in force today or 
will be amended in the future" will be able to serve as a basis for intervention in 
Greece's internal affairs "including the protection of the status and rights of any person 
who is not its citizen" ( Article 4 (3). Its constitution is amended in a way that only 
citizens and its Diaspora can be supported (and not "to the Macedonian people in the 
neighboring countries", as reported to date).  
 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the Prespa Agreement does not mention or regulate 
ethnicity issues. In addition, the amendment to the FYROM (now North Macedonia) Constitution 
states that "citizenship does not determine or predetermine the nationality to which the citizens of 
the country belong." This is explicitly and bindingly referring to FYROM (now North 
Macedonia) and to the verbal consignment sent from Skopje. The Agreement, therefore, does not 
recognize a "Macedonian people" or a "Macedonian nation". The Agreement, moreover, does not 
deny the right of Greek citizens to call the citizens of their neighboring country the conditions 
they use today (Article 7). 
Some constitutional law scholars (Pararas 2018) highly criticized the Agreement, 
stressing some controverted legal issues, but the Prespa Agreement is generally acknowledged as 
an international victory of the Tsipras Government (Tsiliotis 2019). 
 
Parliamentary elections held on 7 July 2019. Syriza loses 
The reforms undertaken by Syriza’s government, especially the socio-economic ones, 
were deemed as not reaching far enough. They were not what the party promised in the 2015 
election campaign. The growing disappointment in the society reached its climax with the 
discussions on the Macedonian issue and the resolution of the problem by an international treaty. 
Research conducted by one of the top Greek public opinion research institutes - Public Issue in 
November 2018 has shown, that 60% of Greeks were against the name for the state – Northern 
Macedonia, and only 28% had a positive attitude towards it (13% definitely positive attitude) 
(Public Issue Report 2018). There was also a dispute in the coalition government which led to its 
dissolution. 
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The next test for Syriza were the consecutive election to the European Parliament and 
local and regional elections held on 26 May 2019. It manager to sustain its 6 mandates, but with 
the support of only 23% of citizens while New Democracy gained a support of 33%. Even bigger 
success awaited for the opposition in the local elections (26 May and 2 June), as it won in 12 out 
of 13 regions and two biggest cities - Athens and Thessaloniki. Kostas Bakoyiannis, the nephew 
of the leader of New Democracy, became the mayor of Athens (his mother was chosen as the first 
women-mayor of Athens in the years 2003-2004). After the failure of European Parliamentary 
elections, Prime Minister Tsipras decided to call for an early elections to the Greek parliament, 
which were held on the 7 July 2019. 
 
Table 2. Parliamentary elections of 7 July 2019 
Political Party Leader Seats Votes (%) Vote number 
New Democracy Kyriakos Mitsotakis 158 39.85 2,251,426 
Syriza Alexis Tsipras 86 31.53 1,781,180 
Movement for Change Fofi Gennimata 22 8.10 457,527 
Communist Party of 
Greece 
Dimistris 
Koutsoumpas 
15 5.30 299,595 
Greek Solution Kyriakos Velopoulos 10 3.70 208,806 
MeRA25 Yianis Varoufakis 9 3.44 194,233 
Source: The Hellenic Parliament. https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Ekloges/ 
Eklogika-apotelesmata-New/#ΙΗ (10/09/2019).  
 
Figure 3. Geographical areas of support in the parliamentary elections of 7 July 2019 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Greek Ministry of Internal Affairs, https://ekloges.ypes.gr/current/v/home/ (10/09/2019). 
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New Democracy with Kyriakos Mitsotakis won also the parliamentary elections, getting 
an absolute majority in the unicameral parliament and creating a one-party government.  Syriza 
gained 31.53% of the votes, losing to the last election by 3.93% which amounted to the loss of 59 
out of the 145 seats it held earlier. Such a big difference in the share of seats between two main 
parties is caused by the use, for the last time, the majority bonus which means that the winner 
gets 50 seats. The result Syriza got in the last elections has to be viewed positively, especially 
taking into consideration problems it had to cope with like economic or migration crisis and 
conducting reforms while having no stable majority in the parliament and coalition government. 
 
Conclusion 
The elections held in 2015 were no doubtely a success for Siriza, which became the main 
political party in Greece. In 2009 in the parliamentary elections it had gained 4.59% of votes, in 
the September of 2015 it was already 35.46% . Such a substantial rise in the support could be not 
possible if it were not for the economic crisis in 2008 and its consequences. 
The difficult social and economic situation, the dependence of Greece on the foreign 
financial support and the need to create a coalition government had a big impact on the intra-
party dynamics, as well as on the political decisions made in government and in parliament. 
Syriza started to govern in the face of the threat of Grexit, the bankruptcy of the state and the 
radicalization of the public opinion and political destabilization. When it was finishing its term it 
was with the resolution of the Macedonian dispute, even if the treaty did not gain the popular 
support. In the economic sphere, the continuation of the austerity agenda was met with a public 
disappointment. Also issues connected to the resolution of the migration crisis and the creation of 
the migration camps in Greece were difficult. The change of the electoral system in the 
parliamentary elections and the New Project of the constitution were only a partial realization of 
Syriza’s plans, as they were not carried out to their fullest, they did not lead to the so called 
Μεταπολίτευση (the change of the political system), which was “to lead New Greece since 2021” 
(Antoniou 2016c). 
Notwithstanding the difficult domestic and foreign determinants, the four years of 
Syriza’s government together with the nationalistic party ANEL were directed at a compromise 
that was to help solve the difficult social economic and political situation. Becoming part of the 
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government meant the abandoning of more radical reforms but did not mean the abandonment of 
plans for the change of the political system.  
Both hypotheses have to be positively verified. Syriza’s time in government was for it a 
test of party’s unity. Till 2013 it was made up of a coalition of over a dozen different political 
formations. With the taking of a less radical political stance, some of its most radical members 
have left. A symbolic change was marked by the fact, that in 2015 an over 90 year old member, 
the leader of the Active Citizens Movement, who tore the Nazi flag from the Partenon in 1941, 
decided to leave. New party began to appear on the left side of the political spectrum: MeRa 25 
of Y. Varoufakis or Greek Solution of K. Velopoulos. Nevertheless, Alexis Tsipras, Syriza’s 
leader has strengthened its leadership in the party and dictated his political vision to its members, 
what led to the further institutionalization of Syriza.  
Syriza came to power in the aftermath of a deep economic and institutional crisis. Its 
earlier anti-establishment stance and radical slogans could be seen as a threat to the Greek 
democracy, but being in government and respecting the state’s earlier commitments to 
international financial institutions kept it from the realization of its radical ideas. Tsipras’s 
government was functioning in the boundaries of the constitutional system. Its political agenda 
was characterized by defending the interests of Greece outside (reparation problems with the 
Germany) and at the same time continuing earlier goals, as increasing the social support, 
legalization of same-sex couples, the building of a mosque in Athens. Syriza’s left populism did 
not hinder it from looking for support from the Greek orthodox Church. 
The parliamentary elections from 7 July 2019 resulted in Syriza moving to opposition. It 
is still one of the main Greek parties and has the support of 30% of voters. Support for other 
parties does not exceed 10%. If next elections establish Syriza’s position, it can replace PASOK 
as a base of Greek two party system. 
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